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Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic
Psychoneurosis, and Law
Paul David Cantor, M. D., LL. B.*
T iS PAPER DEALS WITH COURT DECISIONS on liability claims
for injuries to the mind rather than for broken bones alone.
This subject now is as important to practitioners and students of
the law as it long has been to medical men. Much medical knowl-
edge is now reflected in new interpretations by the courts, so
that today the legal fact is established that a person's emotional
security as well as his physical security must be protected and
compensated. Since injuries to the mind are now so often stated
in actions involving physical injuries, practitioners and students
of the law must keep abreast of medical progress in this field.
The author's purpose is to focus attention on the develop-
ments of recent years as well as those of earlier times, and to
demonstrate that interrelated injuries to the mind and to the
body should be considered equally compensable.
In discussing the question of liability for psychosomatic
injury, it must be borne in mind that there are two sides to the
matter-the medical view, and the legal or judicial view-and
that until recently a very wide gap existed between them, a gap
which is slowly being bridged. To understand why this has been
so it is necessary to understand the underlying philosophy of
each profession.
The doctor is dedicated to preserving life by curing the ail-
ment if possible, but if complete cure is not possible, then to
the alleviation of the attendant pain and discomfort. Quite ob-
viously, the medical profession is constantly searching for better
methods, whether surgical or medical. In one sense, medical
research primarily is based on a "trial-and-error" philosophy.
The lawyer, on the other hand, primarily is sworn to uphold
the law as it is written on the statute books, in the Federal and
State constitutions, or, in the absence of specific legislation, as
it is inherent in the common law. He is imbued by his training
with a conservative approach. The entire system of jurisprudence
rests firmly on "precedents," the "ruling case law" evolved over
* Of Washington, D. C.; Consultant, Medical Jurisprudence; Professor, Legal
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the years from the decisions of trial and appellate tribunals. The
lawyer, therefore, is dedicated to preserving the "rights" and
"duties" which have thus become recognized. Once a workable
system has been developed, one which has been tested by judicial
opinion, there is no great pressure on the legal profession to
substitute untried innovations for the established rules of law.
The divergent approaches of each profession to personal
injury litigation become more understandable when viewed in
the light of the different philosophies of each.
In addition, the historical basis of the law of torts should be
kept in mind. The great Justice Holmes pointed out that in order
to understand what the law is ". . . we must know what it has
been and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult
history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult
labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new
products at every stage. The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is
then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery,
and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results,
depend very much upon its past." I
The Medical View
In any study of psychosomatic injury there occur constantly
certain terms which are more or less unfamiliar to the average
lawyer. It is essential, therefore, that we understand the mean-
ing of a few basic terms. These definitions are not meant to be
comprehensive medical or phychiatric explanations of the terms,
but to give the basic meaning necessary in order to understand
the subject. Incidently, the greatest difficulty encountered in
study or discussion of psychiatric subjects is in the definition of
terms. In cases where an individual has been examined by
several psychiatrists, each diagnosis may be stated in different
terms, although the conclusions will be virtually identical. This
is not due to a difference of understanding as to the patient's
difficulty, but to a difference in terminology. There is no intention
here to revise definitions, but only to state them as they will be
used in the following pages. If a deeper study is desired, the
reader is referred to any of the basic psychiatry texts.
A neurosis is a functional disorder of the nervous system
not dependent on any discoverable wound or physical ab-
1 Holmes, The Common Law, 1-2 (1881).
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normality.. There are many types of neuroses, classified
either as to cause (accident, occupational, war), or as to
behavior (anxiety, association, cardiac, compulsion).
Psyche refers to the mind; the mental life including both
the conscious and unconscious process.
Somatic means pertaining to the body; therefore,
Psychosomatic is as pertaining to the mind-body rela-
tion.
A trauma is actually only a force. This may be either
a somatic trauma, with an injury to the body tissues, or a
psychic trauma, which is an emotional shock that makes a
lasting impression on the mind, either the conscious or sub-
conscious mind.
A neuropath is an individual with a tendency to neurosis.
A psychosomatic injury is one in which there are one or
more abnormal somatic manifestations due to psychic trauma.
A psychoneurosis is an abnormal behavior pattern due
to psychic trauma.
From the similarity in definition of psychosomatic injury and
psychoneurosis, it is obvious that both can be present in the same
individual at the same time, and can be caused by or result from
the same episode. The difference lies only in the reaction of the
particular individual involved. For all practical purposes the
terms are used interchangeably. For example, following an auto-
mobile accident one person may react in a purely psychoneurotic
manner by developing an obsession against riding in an automo-
bile, characterized by fear and nervousness. Another person
under the same circumstances may react to his psychic injury
by developing a "nervous rash," hysterical loss of voice, paralysis,
etc. The difference lies in whether the manifestations are purely
behavioristic, or whether they can be shown somatically.
Although the term psychosomatic injury may be an un-
familiar one to students of law, it is nevertheless the most com-
monly occurring injury, and has been stated in one form or
another in almost all actions involving physical injury. The
author is only attempting to show that these psychoneurotic
and/or psychosomatic injuries can and do exist with or inde-
pendently of somatic damages, and should be considered to be
just as compensable. Research has shown that psychosomatism
has been known and practiced by man for centuries. From the
incantations of the witch doctor driving out the evil spirits to
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the taking of the bizarre and foul medicines of the 17th century,
there are thousands of examples of psychosomatism, in which
man realized that the site of the damage was in the "soul," due
to "evil spirits" or due to the "displeasure of the Gods." Even
centuries ago men knew that some disease was not physical in
nature.
As will be shown below, no physical injury can be completely
somatic-that is, limited strictly to the body and having no effect
at all on the mind of an individual. All bodily injuries are a
combination of physical and emotional disturbance, and only
vary in the relative amount of each factor present. For example,
in the case of a broken leg there is obviously a great amount
of physical injury as represented by the actual fracturing of the
bone, but there is also an emotional factor as may be represented
in pain, apprehension of the final result, fear of clisfigurement
and decrease in financial security. Conversely, an individual may
be involved in an automobile accident, resulting in only a minor
bruise or cut but in a tremendous amount of emotional shock
manifested in fear, persistent inability to sleep, inability to eat,
nightmares, hysterical anesthesia and paralysis, etc. No longer
can an injury be described as either physical or emotional, but
rather physical and emotional. The former concept has been
gradually displaced in medicine for the past two or three decades.
Likewise students of law should now begin to think in this more
progressive interpretation. The most concise statement made
concerning this field was written in Osler's Principles and Prac-
tice of Medicine: "Psychosomatic medicine is that part of medi-
cine which is concerned with an appraisal of the emotional and
physical mechanisms involved in the disease processes of the
individual patient with particular emphasis on the influence that
these two factors exert on each other and on the individual as a
whole." It is an established fact that, other conditions being com-
patible, disturbance of emotion by any cause can produce changes
in bodily function, and development of diseased tissues, often
as predictably as exposure to bacteria or other bodily enemies.2
One of the most common examples of this is found in patients
who, after being under prolonged emotional stress, develop ab-
dominal discomfort, nausea, vomiting, burning, diarrhea, inability
to eat and general nervousness. If the stress is continued they
frequently develop a demonstrable organic peptic ulcer, colitis,
2 See, Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 Clev.-
Mar. L. R. 7 (1957); Crawfis, Conversion Hysteria-An Explanation For At-
torneys, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 31 (1957).
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or other lesion of the gastro-intestinal system, leading possibly
to permanent disability or death.
It is not contended that everyone and anyone will develop
a psychosomatic injury when subjected to a given emotional
trauma. Just as the bones of one person are more resistant to
fracture than the bones of another, and one person's resistance
to bacterial infection is greater than another's, so every person
is individual in his susceptibility to psychic damage. The well-
adjusted person is most unlikely to develop a psychosomatic
injury when subjected to common emotional circumstances.
However, the person already full of frustrations, anxieties and
hostilities, and who has a suitable genetic background, is apt to
develop a disabling psychosomatic injury if subjected to the same
set of circumstances. It has been estimated by the various writers
on this subject that about % of all patients who consult physicians
do not have any definite physical disease to explain their illness.
Approximately another % of all patients who consult physicians
have symptoms that are due in part to emotional factors, even
though some organic abnormality may be present. It has been
the habit all too often in the past to accuse any person suffering
from symptoms not explainable on objective findings of being a
faker or malingerer who is intentionally, falsely complaining in
order to achieve an objective, whether it be family attention or
monetary settlement from an insurance company. This will be
taken up in grbater detail, below.
The possible manifestations of psychosomatic injury are
legion. Here truly is the great imitator, as practically all known
physical disabilities, as well as countless bizarre symptoms, can
be simulated by a psychoneurosis. No attempt can be made to
discuss the various forms in this article, but the reader is referred
to the three outstanding books on the subject: The Neurosis,
by Alvarez; Psychosomatic Medicine, by Weiss and English; and
Psychosomatic Diagnosis, by Flanders Dunbar. Some of the most
common psychosomatic injuries seen include involvement of all
body systems. Everyone has seen or known of a person with a
so-called "nervous rash." Thousands suffer from a cardiac neu-
rosis characterized by consciousness of rapid, forceful beating of
the heart, chest pain, shortness of breath and other symptoms
they have seen in a member of their family or a close friend with
heart disease. There are tremendous numbers of women suffering
real pain and disability in various parts of their bodies, due only
to a fear of cancer after seeing or hearing of such symptoms.
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Stuttering and stammering are good examples of mal-functioning
muscles involved in speech, due to a psychic trauma or illness.
It is safe to say that every student has experienced in various
degrees the psychosomatic results of tension and apprehension
preceding an important examination. This is commonly mani-
fested by abdominal pain, diarrhea, desire to micturate, heart
palpitations, and just plain "shakes."
There is still a great deal of controversy between the pro-
ponents of the theories of heredity versus the theories of environ-
ment concerning the neuropathic individual. Apparently both
factors play a part, as each group presents good evidence. How-
ever, the author agrees with Alvarez in his conception of the
hereditarily emotionally deficient individual. We do not know
how many pairs of genes or hereditary factors go to make up a
"normal" human individual, or how many or which particular
ones control psychic stability. We do know that if the family
histories of neuropaths are sufficiently searched, the chain of
psychic abnormalities is quite apparent. This is just another
way of saying that the individual is no better than the materials
from which he is made. No one will argue that tendencies to
certain physical diseases are hereditary, or even that true major
psychoses (insanity) occurs with predictable regularity in certain
families. However, the concept of an abnormal emotional status
seems more nebulous and difficult to perceive. One of the press-
ing stimuli to the writing of this paper is to crystallize the above
facts as they relate to law, particularly in liability and damages.
Practitioners of any profession dealing -with people should not
deal exclusively with illness or lawsuit or job placement, etc.,
but with human beings and all their ramifications of emotions,
reactions, and feelings. It behooves the alert attorney to keep
abreast of developments of the study of human behavior, so that
he will be more efficient in interpreting and applying the law in
every day practice.
Before proceeding to the legal implications of this subject, it
would be well to review briefly some facts concerning pain. Most
actions concerning personal injury, and certainly all actions con-
cerning psychosomatic injury, include "Pain and suffering." 8 The
American Medical Dictionary merely defines pain as "distress or
suffering," which is not particularly enlightening. 4
8 See, Oleck, Damages To Persons and Property, Chap. 15 (1957 revision).
4 And see, Maloy, Medical Dictionary For Lawyers, 433 (1951) for equally
vague definitions.
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Pain was considered completely a mental state by Aristotle,
and this view was held until well into the nineteenth century.
With. the developments of advanced anatomical knowledge and
the charting of nerve pathways, the concept of pain become purely
an anatomical or physiological reaction. Recently, as in the con-
cept of injury, pain is considered a psycho-physiological phe-
nomenon, with a growing emphasis on the psyche.
Pain is made up of at least three components. First the
sensation or stimulation of the nervous system at some point.
Second the conscious feeling of pure discomfort not con-
nected with any past or future association. Third the body's re-
action, which may be fight or flight, protection of the involved
part, or any of the possible emotions such as anger, depression,
fear, apprehension, etc. As we shall see, this latter factor is most
important.
The "pain threshold" is the minimal amount of stimulation
which will cause the perso'n to be conscious of pain. This is fairly
constant as a rule, but varies with the person's attitude and emo-
tional status.
Since pain is a combination of varying amounts of nerve
stimulation plus the mental conversion of the stimulation, it fol-
lows that there are all degrees of the various types of pain,
ranging from the pain reaction of a normally reacting individual
to a pin prick of the finger, to the pain of a part of the body due
purely to psychic projection. Cooper and Braceland have divided
pain into the following seven classes: The first is the normal
perception group, in which the threshold is found to be steady
and reaction to stimulation follows what the average person
would expect. The second group includes those with a hyper-
reactivity. These are people who complain more than usual with
minimal amounts of stimulation. They recover poorly from ill-
ness and surgery. Frequently these people are thought of as
"neurotics" by their fellow workers. The next or third group
include the people who have psychic perpetuation of pain long
after the original stimulation is removed. Examples of this
group include those persons who have become narcotic addicts
because of the need for such drugs early in their illness. Even
if the organic abnormality is removed, they suffer the original
pain if the narcotics are withheld. Another outstanding segment
of this group are those who have developed traumatic neuroses.
After a trauma they fail to readjust from the fear and appre-
hension, and the fear initiated by the accident becomes perma-
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nent. The pain does not subside, because the person develops
an intense fixation to the injury. The fourth group includes the
perpetuation of fear due to a psychoneurosis. These people find
a great gratification in attention attracted by their illness, and
come to fear recovery because they may lose the emotional
props of doctors, family and friends. These people spend a life-
time of martyrdom to their pain. The fifth class is known as the
"Gestalt" pain group. This group represents pain equally due to
physical and mental factors. These are usually exemplified by
amputees, who have pain in phantom limbs due to both physical
causes and emotional trauma of the loss of the part.
The next group represent pain induced psychogenically, and
is represented by tension headaches, painful contractions of the
stomach, and low backache. The underlying process in these
people is as follows: The person is emotionally immature, and in
such a person nervous tension builds up to such an extent that an
overflow of nervous impulses flows into a group of muscles, with
resulting prolonged contraction and pain. The last group is the
one representing psychogenic pain. This group is of no particular
importance to the present paper, but only represents the projec-
tion of psychic conflicts of the individual to some organ of his
body, without abnormal tension in the organ to which the pain
is referred.
Closely connected with the subject of pain is malingering.
The malingerer is one who willfully and consciously expresses
non-existent symptoms and simulated signs of disease, for per-
sonal gain. This gain may be financial, as from insurance com-
panies, compensation boards or other defendants; or it may be
emotional, as exemplified by increased consideration from other
persons, or evasion of responsibility. The neurotic fools himself,
while the malingerer tries to fool others. Probably no other
single fact has had a more adverse influence on the courts' views
of recognition and acceptance of traumatic neurosis than ma-
lingering. The dicta of many decisions have voiced a fear that if
neurosis is accepted as a basis of recovery, that will open the
courts to a flood of unfounded litigation. At one time this may
have Veen a valid consideration, but today, with increased medical
knowledge and methods of testing, it is most unlikely. Very
rarely, today, can a malingerer recover damages. It would be
most unjust to deny recovery to the many because of the pos-
sibility of an undeserved recovery in a rare instance.
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The obvious attitude of a malingerer is frequently a basis
for a strong suspicion of his mental state. He may be resentful
of investigation, appear shy and afraid to look at the examiner,
or be very assured in the telling of his stereotyped story. He
usually will not allow an examiner's assistant to interrogate or
examine him. But the neurotic is likely to be anxious to tell his
story or to demonstrate his abnormalities to anyone who will
listen.
One will almost always get the impression while talking to
a malingerer that "all is not well," even though the exact point
of deviation is not apparent. There is a lack of sincerity that
almost alWays leaks through. If the malingerer is asked to repeat
his story it will almost always be exactly repeated, even verba-
tim. If he is asked to repeat it from a certain point, he hesitates
as if he is mentally running through the learned story to that
point, when he will then start to recite it exactly as it was told
before. A neurotic, on the other hand, will almost always vary
the tale as it is retold.
It is during the physical examination of the malingerer that
he can be fooled into making his fatal mistake. To expose the
fraud, it is necessary to confuse the patient. This may be ac-
complished by visual confusion with mirrors, in reversed images
and changed distances. If he can be distracted and confused by
doing more than one thing at a time, he will be led into making a
mistake. He can frequently be exposed by use of mental con-
fusion, by asking and touching while the patient cannot see.
The direction of the fraud will, except for the special senses,
be either pain, disturbance of function, or disturbance of sensa-
tion.
Contrary to popular belief, it is most difficult to pretend pain
of any consequence. In acute pain, a person's pupils dilate, his
pulse rate increases and he will complain if the painful part is
moved or touched, even if his attention is directed elsewhere.
In chronic pain the facial features become drawn and general
health is impaired. The face of a malingerer is calm and relaxed,
and his general appearance and attitude is not what one would
expect if he were suffering pain.
There are many ways of trapping a malingerer claiming in-
volvement of function or muscle power. Based on a knowledge
of anatomy, certain movements may be directed in which the
malingerer will inadvertently use the supposed paralyzed or
weakened muscles. Fraudulent muscle weakness claims may be
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exploded by accurately measuring muscle strength in certain
anatomical positions.
The fraudulent claim simplest to disrupt is numbness. The
patient is incapable of controlling his body's reaction to painful
stimuli applied to supposed anesthetic areas. Furthermore, if
only a partial anesthesia is claimed, the person will be unable to
accurately map out the area repeatedly as the examiner touches
him.
There are a multitude of tests developed towards exposing
malingering involving sight. Some examples include confusing
lenses in order to change sight distances, different colored lenses
in front of each eye while the patient is told to read a chart
made up of variously colored figures or letters, converging tubes
of sight, examination of the eyeball by means of opthalmological
instruments, and muscular tests of eyelid function. This is a field
of testing where a competent examiner can find practically every
case of malingering.
Hearing loss is another commonly claimed injury in ma-
lingerers. This is usually a futile attempt, as any trained ex-
aminer can, without complicated equipment, so confuse the
patient that he will be unable to be consistent in stating which
ear is hearing sound. A common, simple test is to apply an or-
dinary stethoscope to the blindfolded patient's ears while the
examiner whispers test words into the opening of the other end
of the instrument, meanwhile pinching off the rubber tubing to
one and then the other of the patient's ears. When the examiner
insists on promptness of response, the patient soon becomes con-
fused and his futile attempt is obvious.
It is quite clear that diagnosis of malingering should never
be made until a complete examination of the person is effected.
It is one thing to suspect, but another to prove. In the hands of a
capable examiner, malingering can be demonstrated, if present.
It is important to distinguish malingering from hysteria, and im-
portant to keep in mind that the former is much rarer than the
latter.
The Legal and Judicial View
The general purpose of the law of torts is to give protection
to the individual against certain forms of harm to person, prop-
erty or reputation at the hands of his neighbors-not necessarily
because they are wrong, but because they are harms. But the
individual is not protected from all harms. Unlimited protection
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obviously would interfere with equally important enjoyments on
the part of his neighbors. The law permits certain things to be
done regardless of the fact that harm to another will follow from
them. A person owning a piece of land may erect a building
which will obscure another's beautiful view, or may establish a
business that will compete with and perhaps destroy the business
of another. On the other hand, on the ground of public policy
the law may throw the entire burden or responsibility on the
person engaging in certain transactions, with no regard to cul-
pability. Instances of this type arise in the carrying of pistols,
the keeping of vicious animals, and the like. Moreover, as Justice
Holmes points out: "Our system of private liability for the con-
sequences of a man's own acts, that is, for his trespasses, started
from the notion of actual intent and actual personal culpability." 5
In tracing the evolution of recovery for personal injuries,
Holmes also reminds us that our theory of damages payable by
the defendant stems from the blood feuds of the Roman and
Germanic peoples, from which grew the idea of compensation as
an alternative to the feud-at first voluntary and later com-
pulsory. He then traces the theory of blood feud or vengeance
through the Greek and Jewish philosophies, citing as one of the
earliest clearcut expositions of the vengeance principle. Exodus
(xxi. 28): "If an ox gore a man or woman, that they die: then the
ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but
the owner of the ox shall be quit." Note that originally the
owner lost the ox-the wrong attached to the thing and was con-
fiscated-and only indirectly was the owner punished. Later the
owner was permitted to refuse to give up the animal, or slave or
thing, and instead to pay the value of the animal, slave, or other
object.
As it became customary to permit compensation in lieu of
vengeance, the scope of such compensation was limited to the
scope of vengeance-vengeance connoting blame-"an opinion,
however distorted by passion, that a wrong had been done."
Therefore, vengeance, later compensation as an alternative, did
not "go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted:
even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked." 6 This principle of "a harm intentionally inflicted" re-
mained for many years as a necessary element in order to sustain
a claim for damages for personal injuries. The cause of action
5 Holmes, The Common Law, 4 (1881); and see, Prosser, Law of Torts, 38
(2d ed., 1955).
6 Ibid., Holmes, p. 3.
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originally was always an intentional wrong, causing physical
injury. Only after much discussion and argument was it ex-
tended, first to include harms which were foreseen, but which
were not the intended consequence of the defendant's act, and
then still later to unforeseen injuries.
Like medicine in its early days, the practice of law then was
much more primitive, and the right of action was a narrow and
limited one. Even though a wrongful act was committed the
wrongdoer was liable only for the "natural, and direct or proxi-
mate consequences" of his act or omission. As a corollary, re-
mote consequences of such act or omission would not constitute
a basis for recovery. Originally, no cognizance was taken of any-
thing that could not be seen and definitely weighed. Damage to
a property right was the real basis of action, along with personal
injury resulting in impairment of earning power, or injury to a
man's spouse or child because in a sense they were his "prop-
erty" and he was entitled to their productivity, or prospective
earnings.
Fright, mental disturbance and the like cannot be seen and
weighed. Moreover, until recently mental illness as such went
unevaluated even by the medical profession. Insanity, whether
mild or violent, was considered to be the result of the individual's
own sins-a punishment which one should not seek to mitigate.
It is not surprising therefore that the law took no cognizance of
mental suffering, particularly when in fact it was not put forward
as an item of the damages sought. The general rule therefore-
developed over a period of time-was that mental pain and suf-
fering, standing alone, would not constitute a sufficient basis for
recovery of substantial damages. There were exceptions, such
as for injuries to personal security, character or reputation,
domestic relations of the injured person, or where mental suf-
fering was recognized as the ordinary, natural and probable con-
sequence of the injury complained of.
As the medical profession began to look upon mental health
as an integral part of a completely healthy and vigorous indi-
vidual, more and more studies conclusively sustained the con-
cept that the individual is the end product of the interaction of
the "psyche" and the "soma." As this conclusion was increasingly
brought to the attention of the courts in personal injury cases,
the strict interpretation of "foreseeable" consequences also un-
derwent a change. Gradually, the courts began snipping away
the doctrine so impressively stated by Lord Wensleydale in
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Lynch v. Knight, "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act com-
plained of causes that alone." 7
Perhaps the best exposition of the drastic changes in the
judicial view is found in a comparison of the applicable sections
of the Restatement of the Law of Torts as originally published by
the American Law Institute in 1934, and as revised in 1948.
Under the heading "The Interest in Freedom from Emotional
Distress-Conduct Intended to Cause Emotional Distress Only"
the Restatement (1934) stated: 8
"Except as stated in sec. 21 to 34 and sec. 48,9 conduct
which is intended or which though not so intended is likely
to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to another
does not subject the actor to liability
(a) for emotional distress resulting therefrom, or
(b) for bodily harm unexpectably resulting from such
disturbance."
This was followed by certain comments, among them:
"Extent of legal protection to interest in freedom from
emotional distress. The interest in mental and emotional
tranquillity and, therefore, in freedom from mental and
emotional disturbances is not, as a thing in itself, regarded
as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain from
conduct intended or recognizably likely to cause such a dis-
turbance. Conduct, either of act or omission, which is in-
tended or likely to cause only mental or emotional distress is
not tortious. Therefore, it cannot subject the actor to liability
no matter what its consequences. .. "
The Comment went on to say that even should the conduct
result in an invasion of the other's interest in bodily security, or
an invasion of any other of his interests (which are protected
against tortious invasion whether intentional or negligent) the
actor would not be liable.
Less than fifteen years later the Restatement, as revised,
read thus:
"One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another is liable
(a) for such emotional distress, and
(b) for bodily harm resulting from it."
7 9 H. L. Gas. 577, 598, 11 Engl. Repr. 854 (1861).
8 Sec. 46.
9 See. 21 to 34 deal with highly specialized forms of mental disturbance
arising from realizing that a harmful or offensive contact is contemplated.
Sec. 48 deals with liability of carriers for insults by their servants.
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(Note: Sec. 47 provides that where one intends bodily
harm and only mental disturbance results, he is not liable
for the mental disturbance. However, if by his conduct the
actor becomes liable for any invasion of any legally pro-
tected interest, then the mental disturbance is taken into
account in assessing damages.)
The Revised Restatement also has this comment:
"This is a part of the law of torts in which real develop-
ments have occurred in recent years and this development is
continuing. The cases which have appeared since 1934 estab-
lish that the interest in freedom from severe emotional dis-
tresses protected against intentional invasion.... The change
in section 46 is necessary in order to give an accurate Re-
statement of the present American law. There is a definite
trend today in the United States to give an increasing amount
of protection to the interest in freedom from emotional dis-
tress."
Of even greater interest is the fact that the original Restate-
ment contains no Caveat to this section, while the 1948 Revision
contains the following:
"The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether one
who recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is or is not liable for it.
"The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether one
who negligently causes severe emotional distress is, in cer-
tain circumstances, liable for it."
Judicial opinion regarding compensation for bodily injuries
has progressed in three stages:
1. Compensation was awarded for wrongful death, or maim-
ing which interfered with the ability to earn a living.
The wrongful act had to be intentional-negligence, no
matter how gross, would not create liability.
2. Negligence that was flagrant and "in reckless disregard
of the rights of others" eventually was considered to
create liability, and less serious bodily injuries were ad-
judged compensable.
3. The present attitude of the courts is that where one is
under a duty, express or implied, negligence may be im-
puted from conduct which results in injury to another.
Damage to one's reputation grew out of the assumption that
such injury resulted in a lessening of the ability to earn a living,
and was therefore compensable. A similar theory underlay pro-
tection of a woman against attacks on her virtuous reputation-
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it lessened possibility for marriage. Mere superficial injuries to
the body were not at first considered to warrant an award unless,
as in the case of the loss of an arm or leg, the earning capacity
of the individual was seriously affected; the damages awarded
might be merely nominal. Gradually, lesser injuries (when in-.
tentionally inflicted) were considered to be compensable, and
still later negligence was held to create liability.
In the case of "psychosomatic" injuries 10 the evolution of
judicial opinion has followed the same path, and the degree of
liability has been expanded along somewhat the same line: first,
when arising contemporaneously with traceable physical injuries;
next, physical injuries arising after the wrongful act and stem-
ming from the shock, fright, or trauma; and last and most recent,
for mental injury where no physical injury occurs. Here too, as
in the case of bodily injuries, the courts more and more created
a "fiction" of touching and contact, in order to sustain a causal
chain of consequences.
Where there has been an intentional wrongful act, the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that such an act creates a
liability on the part of the actor.
A fifteen year old girl was allowed to recover for mental
anguish, nervous shock, and serious and permanent injuries to
her health when the defendent charged her with unchastity and
threatened her with reform school unless she confessed to a mis-
deed, in Johnson v. Sampson." The Court said: ". . . we see no
10 It is interesting to note that the term "psychosomatic" is still generally
unknown in legal terminology insofar as the cases, digests and law reviews
examined indicate. Cases which would properly fall under the definition of
psychosomatic injury as used here are variously found under such headings
as "nervous hysteria," "nervous shock," "fright," "psychic trauma," and
"traumatic neurosis."
All of these are conditions which give rise to symptoms and/or signs
which cannot be traced to any physical, demonstrable change in either the
nervous systems or the organs of the body and are therefore acknowledged
to be due to psychological causes. Among the most commonly reported
symptoms are: loss or impairment of vision, hearing or memory; loss or
impairment of muscular control; impairment of speech; hysterical paralysis;
muscular twitchings; convulsions; violent weeping; irritability; disturbed
sleep or sleeplessness; tremors and trembling; loss of weight; rapid and
strongly beating heart; and general anxiety and discomfort.
See, Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 Harv. L. R. 1033 (1936); Note, 25 So. Calif. L. R. 440 (1952); Prosser, Law
of Torts, Secs. 11, 37 (2d ed., 1955); Earengay, Legal Consequences of Shock,
2 Medico Legal & Crim. Rec. 14 (1934); Campbell, Injury Without Impact,
1951 Insur. L. J. 654; and arguing against any liability: Note, 26 Geo. L. J.
144 (1937); and see, Reveno, Trauma and Diabetes, 36 Mich. S. B. J. 31
(1957); Foster, Juridical Trauma and Medical Shock, 59 W. Va. L. R. 1
(1956); Shechter, Traumatic Neuroses, 30 Ohio Bar 218 (1957).
11 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814, 46 A. L. R. 722 (1926).
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good reason why a wrongful invasion of a legal right, causing an
injury to the body or mind which reputable physicians recognize
and can trace with reasonable certainty to the act as its true
cause, should not give rise to a right of action against the wrong-
doer, although there was no visual hurt at the time of the act
complained. .. ."
There exists also a large body of judicial opinion to the effect
that even though the objective is a lawful and legal one, such as
the collection of a debt, wrongful and intentional means of ac-
complishment create a liability, nevertheless. Examples of these
are found in the so-called "collection cases." A milestone in this
field, and one which has been quoted frequently, is Barnett v.
Collection Service Co.,1 2 an Iowa case decided in 1932. This case
was a forward step in recognition by the courts that one who
causes emotional distress--even when no physical contact is in-
volved and the object is lawful-creates for himself a liability for
the results. A widow with two children, employed by a drygoods
company, incurred a debt for coal, which was turned over to the
agency for collection. The language in the dunning letters was
coarse, threatening to sue, to "tie [you] up tighter than a drum"
unless settlement was made; to bother her employer "until he is
so disgusted with you that he will throw you out the back door";
suggesting she was as bad as a criminal, and similar statements.
The court, per Faville, J., went over the leading cases in the
jurisdiction (prefacing the review by this comment: "A recon-
ciliation of all the cases is impossible") and reviewed those in
other jurisdictions on this point. It then drew a distinction be-
tween injuries resulting from fright caused by negligence, where
no physical injury is shown, and that of fright due to a willful
act, although neither negligence nor physical injury is alleged.
The reasoning in the Barnett case was followed by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska two years later in LaSalle Extension
University v. Fogarty,"3 and was cited by the court in its opinion.
In Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corporation,14 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina (1936) upheld a verdict awarding damages to
plaintiff for illness and a miscarriage resulting from angry and
profane language used to her by the defendant's bill collection
agent.
12 242 N. W. 25.
13 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
14 188 S. E. 625.
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Chief Justice Stacy in his opinion said that the gravamen of
the complaint was trespass on the person, which "may result from
an injury either wilfully or negligently." Referring to Hill v.
Kimball,15 where the facts were similar, Justice Stacy quoted
from the opinion in that case: "That a physical personal injury
may be produced through a strong emotion of the mind there
can be no doubt. . .
Another case cited by Justice Stacy was Engle v. Simmons,"6
which was an action of a similar nature, in which the court com-
mented that physical violence to the person is not necessary in
order to sustain an action.
Taking cognizance of the divergent views in some opinions,
nevertheless Justice Stacy felt that,
"... much of the confusion on the subject seems to have
come from worshipping at the shrine of words and formulas,
rather than applying correct principles to the facts in hand.
(Citing cases.) It is no doubt correct to say that fright alone
is not actionable . . .but it is faulty pathology to assume
that nervous disorders of serious proportions may not flow
from fear or fright. .. ."
The Court of Appeals of Georgia took a similar view in 1937,
as did the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in 1939. The first case, Interstate Life & Accident Co.
v. Brewer,17 is particularly interesting because the decision con-
tains a quotation from a previous opinion of the same court:
"Even in the absence of willfulness or wantonness, the
mere wrongful act of the agent will authorize a recovery
where the resulting fright, shock, or mental suffering is at-
tended with actual immediate physical injury, or where from
the nature of the fright or mental suffering there naturally
follows as a direct consequence, physical or mental impair-
ment; and in either of such events the fright or mental suf-
fering can itself be considered, together with the accom-
panying physical injury or such resulting physical or mental
impairment, as an element of damages."
Equally far reaching was the opinion in the second case men-
tioned, another bill-collector case: Clark v. Associated Retail
Credit Men of Washington, D. C.18 In that case the court pushed
aside the defense that the peculiar physical condition of the plain-
15 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59, 7 L. R. A. 619 (1890).
16 148 Ala. 92, 41 S. 1023, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96 (1906).
17 193 S. E. 459; 47 Ga. App. 778, 780.
18 105 F. 2d 62.
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tiff was a factor in the injuries he suffered. This decision demon-
strated that the concept of psychosomatic illness was beginning
to permeate judicial decisions, even though the term itself did
not appear. The court said:
"... If we are in one of the 'open spaces' in the law of
this jurisdiction we must fill it as well as we can, with a view
to the social interests which seem to be involved and with
such as we can get from authorities elsewhere and from 'logic
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted stand-
ards of right conduct... .'19
"In legal terminology, 'bodily harm is any impairment of
the physical condition of another's body or physical pain or
illness' 20 and 'the minute disturbance of the nerve centers
caused by fear, shock, or other emotions does not constitute
bodily harm,'"1 although it may produce it. The conventional
terminology is used in this opinion. But lawyers have begun
to learn from doctors and physiologists that 'We fear not in
our hearts alone, not in our brains alone, not in our viscera
alone-fear influences every organ and tissue.' 22 'And what
is true of fear is true in kind, though not in degree, of the
lesser emotions such as worry and anxiety.' 23 The tendency
of the law to ignore 'mental' harm diminishes. The notion
that it cannot give redress for such harm is long since ex-
ploded; it can, and it frequently does-usually in connection
with harm of other kinds, as in battery, false imprisonment
and defamation. 24 But the conventional distinction between
mental and physical harm still plays a large part in the
law....
"'We would expect ... the gradual emergence of a broad
principle somewhat to this effect: that one, who, without
just cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds of decency,
purposely causes a disturbance of another's mental and emo-
tional tranquillity of so acute a nature that harmful physical
consequences might be not unlikely to result, is subject to
liability in damages for such mental and emotional disturb-
19 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 112, 113, in Selected Writings
(Hall, ed., 1947).
20 Am. Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 15.
21 Ibid., Comment B. "Severe shock" alone is recognized as a form of "ill
health" or "illness" in Owens v. Liverpool Corporation [1938], 4 All Eng.
727 (Court of Appeal).
22 Crile, The Origin and Nature of the Emotions, p. 60; quoted in Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 496, 498 (1922).
23 Ibid., Goodrich, op. cit. p. 503.
24 In connection with forcible ejection from a train for example, it is recog-
nized that "Wounding a man's feelings is as much actual damage as breaking
his limbs." (Cases cited.)
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ance even though no demonstrable physical consequences
actually ensue.' 25
"In the present case the shock which defendant inten-
tionally inflicted not only risked, but actually caused, physi-
cal pain. In such circumstances, recovery has repeatedly
been allowed." 28
Where negligent acts caused fright or shock which in turn
resulted in physical injury, the courts as far back as the early
19 0 0's had begun to pierce the artificial barrier precluding re-
covery. One of the early cases where damages were awarded
for physical injuries stemming from shock was Pankopf v.
Hinkley,27 decided in 1909 by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
In this case a woman was awarded compensation for a miscar-
riage caused by defendant's negligence in running his automobile
into a horse-drawn vehicle in which she was riding.
The judge distinguished the facts from those in the leading
Wisconsin cases2 8 which had set out the doctrine then prevalent
that there can be no recovery for damages for "mere mental
anguish, which is not preceded by or accompanied with some
physical injury." In this case, the physical injury (miscarriage)
was a subsequent result of the fright.
Compare this decision with the Massachusetts results reached
in Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co. 29 in 1897; and by the New York
Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.30 in 1896. The
courts in those cases held (in conformity with the Pennsylvania
rule at that time, which in turn was based on an English Case) 3 1
that there could be no recovery for a physical illness due entirely
to the internal operation of fright, there being no immediate
physical injury caused by the defendant's conduct.
Spade v. Lynn has been the cause of a good deal of dicta in
attempts to differentiate t from later cases. According to the
25 And see, Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1058 (1936).
26 Recovery has even been allowed in various types of cases in which de-
fendant has unintentionally but negligently subjected plaintiff to a mental
shock likely to result, and actually resulting, in physical harm.
27 123 N. W. 625.
28 Summerfield v. W. U. Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N. W. 973, as affirmed in
Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 20, 81 N. W. 1003, and subsequent cases.
29 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88, 38 L. R. A. 512; 60 Am. St. Rep. 393; and Miller
v. B. & 0. S. W. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. E. 499, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.)
949 (1908).
30 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354.
31 Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888), which
had already been overruled in England.
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court, the general rule " . . . limiting damages in such a case
to the natural and probable consequences of the acts done is of
wide application, and has often been expressed and applied."
32
This "general rule," however, was already being breached,
and logically so, even fifty years ago. There is no real legal justi-
fication for it. Any justification rests on so-called public policy
and expediency, based on the reasoning that it is impossible to
measure degrees of fright or to adjudge just compensation, and
that to grant compensation would open the courts to many false
claims. That this is illogical is apparent when one realizes that
allowance is made for mental pain and for injury to mind and
nerve as well as body, generally in all cases of liability for per-
sonal injury where there is impact.3 3 It would obviously be just
as easy to malinger in such cases-and as difficult to detect-
as in cases where there is no impact and fright is the intervening
agency of transmittal. When neurasthenia is claimed as a result
of bodily injury, the connection between the injury and the
disease, and the extent and severity of the disease, are no less
uncertain and subject to objective tests than when fright takes
the place of bodily impact. It is true that the fright itself may be
an issue not easily challenged when met, but this does not seem
to be sufficient reason to lay down a rule shutting out recovery
for its consequences in all cases.
In order for liability to attach to a wrongful negligent act, it
was held in the earlier cases that there must have been an actual
impact, a "touching" of the person of the plaintiff. This in turn
led to much strained interpretation of what constituted a "touch-
ing," in order to differentiate the individual cases from the doc-
trine laid down in Spade v. Lynn and Mitchell v. Rochester
Railway Co., supra. However, in a case decided ten years after
these two decisions (1907), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
in Simone v. Rhode Island Co.,34 said that where physical troubles
follow fright-they need not accompany it-an action will lie,
even in the absence of any contact-injury.
After noting that defendant had not cited Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R. R. Co.,3 5 the court went on to discuss extensively Bell
32 For a discussion of this general view, see The Black Gull, 82 F. 2d 758
(C. C. A. 2, 1936).
33 Wasmuth article, supra, n. 2; Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 37 (2d ed., 1955).
34 28 R. I. 186, 66 A. 202, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 740.
35 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88, 38 L. R. A. 512; see supra, at n. 29. Defendant
relied on Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., supra, n. 30, as well as Ewing
v. P. C. and St. Louis Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340, and Victorian Railway
447
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v. Great Northern Railway Co., 36 quoting extensively from the
opinion, which closed as follows:
"In conclusion, then I am of the opinion, that, as the re-
lation between fright and injury to the nerve and brain
structures of the body is a matter which depends entirely
upon scientific and medical testimony, it is impossible for
any court to lay down as a matter of law, that if negligence
cause fright, and such fright, in its turn, so affects such
structures as to cause injury to health, such injury cannot
be 'a consequence which, in the ordinary course of things,
would flow from the' negligence, unless such injury 'ac-
company such negligence in point of time'."
The court also cited Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.,3 7 which
held that if through the negligence of a carrier a passenger is
placed in imminent danger, sufficient to cause fright, which in
turn causes nervous convulsions and illness, the negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury, and the injury is one for
which damages may be sought.38
The court noted with particular approval Dulieu v. White
& Sons,39 in which plaintiff, who was pregnant, while serving
behind her husband's bar was frightened by a van and horses
being negligently driven into the room. As a result of the shock
she became seriously ill and later gave birth to an idiot child.
She was held to have a good cause of action.
The same court which held (Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,
supra) that there could be no recovery for a physical injury due
to the purely internal operation of fright or other emotional dis-
turbance, "there being no immediate physical injury caused by
the defendant's conduct," thirty-five years later completely re-
versed itself, in Comstock v. Wilson.40 Plaintiff and his wife,
riding in his car, were both jarred by a collision with defendant's
car, which also loosened a fender. Plaintiff's wife stepped from
the car and began to write down the defendant's name and license
(Continued from preceding page)
Corers. v. Coultas, supra, n. 31, which had already been discredited in
England. All these dealt with actual physical or nervous disorders resulting
from negligence. Other cases cited by defendant were for mere fright un-
accompanied by any immediate physical injury, nor resulting in any nervous
physical or nervous disorder.
36 26 L. R. (Ir.) Ex. Driv. 428, 438.
37 48 Minn. 134, 138, 50 N. W. 1036, 16 L. R. A. 203 (1892).
s8 See also, Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 32
L. R. A. 193 (1896).
39 70 L. J. (Kings Bench Div.) 837, 842.
40 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. F,. 431, 76 A. L. R. 676 (1931).
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number, and while so doing fainted, and in falling fractured her
skull, all within a few minutes of the accident, and twenty
minutes later she died from the skull injury. The court awarded
damages.
In Sider v. Reid Ice Cream CO.'4 1 the same court in 1925, in
finding for plaintiff, had called for a change in the unrealistic
old rules.
In addition to cases where the negligent acts of the defendant
result in an actual impact causing slight or very grave injury,
accompanied by shock or psychic trauma producing psycho-
logically induced injuries and emotional distress, where such
results follow the invasion of some other legally protected in-
terest, the courts are practically unanimous that recovery may
be had. Once the defendant's negligence has been proven and
directly connected with plaintiffs injury, it creates a liability
for all consequences actually caused by the negligence, and
plaintiff's previous condition of health (as predisposing him to
injury) may not be offered as a defense. Purcell v. St. Paul City
Railway Co., 4 2 and Flood v. Smith,43 stated this rule clearly.
One who sustains the slightest bodily injury by immediate
contact, may recover for an illness brought on not only by the
shock of receiving the injury but for an illness brought on by the
fear of receiving it, and for all emotional distress whether severe
or minor. In Wells v. Home Indemnity Co., 44 plaintiff developed
severe attacks of nausea and vomiting a few days after an acci-
dent-diagnosed as traumatic neurosis. The Court held that it
was immaterial that physicians failed to find any objective
symptoms of injury to the plaintiff. In Thompson vs. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. of Hartford45 the court upheld the claim of plaintiff for
total disability, under an insurance policy, where plaintiff de-
veloped nervous spells and irritability and was obsessed with fear
that he would do harm to his wife and child physically, after a
piece of steel flew into his eye from the machine he was working
on. Where plaintiff, an electrical engineer working as a lineman
for defendant, received a slight shock from a wire negligently
left open by defendant's agent, seemed uninjured physically but
41't 211 N]. Y/. S. 5%2.
42 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, 16 L. R. A. 203 (1892).
43 126 Conn. 644, 13 A. 2d 677 (1940); and see Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562,
196 S. W. 2d 913 (1946).
44 1 F. 2d 453 (La. App. 1942).
45 177 S. C. 120, 180 S. E. 880 (1935).
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became hysterical, temporarily paralyzed, and then began to
twitch and shake, and developed a morbid fear of electricity, he
recovered for his psychosomatic injuries. 46 For a thorough dis-
cussion of these types of cases and a listing of cases by states, see
Johnson & Sampson, Traumatic Neuroses in Court; and Smith,
Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 Virginia Law
Review 87 and 194 (1943).
Although no case has been taken to the Supreme Court re-
cently on which prior rulings might have made obsolete its rul-
ings on this point, the Federal courts are slowly coming to the
view of the majority of the State courts. A recent evidence of
this is found in Kaufman v. Western Union Telegraph Company,
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Cir-
cuit, July 28, 195547 (rehearing denied August 31, 1955). The
case was the result of defendant's messenger erroneously de-
livering and announcing a telegram as a "death message," when
in fact it merely notified the sender's mother of her anticipated
arrival. A summary judgment for the defendant was reversed
and remanded.
Indicating the frame of mind of the court, the court said "No
doubt the law as to liability for mental anguish alone is in a
stage of development," and then quoted verbatim Section 46
of the Restatement as revised. The closing words of this opinion
would seem to foreshadow the probable furture view of the
Supreme Court, and certainly the position the federal courts
will take:
"Enough has been said to indicate that the literature on
the subject is voluminous, if not exhaustive . . . For our-
selves, we can see no more reason for denying recovery
where physical injury follows mental anguish than in those
cases ordinarily encountered where mental anguish follows
physical injury."
The third class of cases is even more significant for our
present discussion: namely cases in which the wrongful act is
negligent, where there is no physical injury in the stiict sense
of the word. In Netitsil v. Novah,48 the owner of a vicious dog
was held liable for the shock and nervous prostration suffered
by the plaintiff, walking along the street outside the defendant's
46 Summerskill v. Vermont Paper & Mfg. Co., 91 Vt. 251, 99 A. 1017 (1917).
But see, as to miscarriage, Note, 15 U. Chi. L. R. 188 (1947).
47 224 F. 2d 723.
48 120 Nebr. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (1931); and Note, 13 Nebr. L. R. 422 (1935).
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grounds, when the dog crouched down in a menacing way, bared
its teeth, and growled at her. The dog did not leave his owner's
property, but the plaintiff had on a previous occasion been at-
tacked by the dog, and on the occasion in question was so
frightened that she fainted. The court held that there is a
liability for physical injuries which are proximately caused by
fright and terror produced by one who owes a legal duty to the
one injured.
Another recent case (1945) is extremely interesting and
quite unusual. In Blakely v. Shortal's Estate,49 the Supreme
Court of Iowa said that the rule denying liability for injuries re-
sulting from fright, where no physical injury is shown, cannot be
invoked where fright was due to a willful act, and that the term
"willful act" contemplates a voluntary or intentional act.50
The Supreme Court of Montana, in a case involving a car-
rier, Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 5 1 had laid special emphasis
on the following statement:
"..-. 'It must be conceded that a nervous shock or
paroxysm, or a disturbance of the nervous system, is dis-
tinct from mental anguish, and falls within the physiological,
rather than the psychological, branch of the human organism.
It is a matter of general knowledge that an attack of sudden
fright, or an exposure to imminent peril, has produced in
individuals a complete change in their nervous system ...
Such a result must be regarded as an injury to the body
rather than to the mind, even though the mind be at the same
time injuriously affected.' . .
The unusual feature of the Blakely case is that the action
resulted from a claim in probate filed by a woman in whose
kitchen the decedent had committed suicide. The sight of the
bloody horror had terrified the plaintiff. The lower court held
that no cause of action had been proven since it did not exist
at the death of the wrongdoer and therefore, there was "no
cause of action to survive. It is a general rule that a cause of
action for tort does not arise, or is not complete, until there is
an injury." The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
cause of action did survive, and having survived it then became
a question of whether a cause of action was proven, since the
49 236 Iowa 787, 20 N. W. 2d 28; Noted, 44 Mich. L. R. 486 (1945).
50 See the criticism of the view that fright caused by blasting is merely an
indirect harm, for which no recovery can be had without proof of negligence,
in Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N. E. 970 (1914), L. R. A.
1915 E.
51 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934), citing the Sloane case, above, n. 38.
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injury and damages were due to fright, and in the absence of
other physical injury. It appears that the case was subsequently
settled. In a similar Ohio case in 1929 recovery was denied.5
2
But in 1956 Ohio granted damages for mental injury on the
theory of invasion of privacy,- contrary to its old requirement of
impact.53 Texas employs the theory of assault, for the same pur-
pose.54 South Carolina uses the theory of nuisance.55 Various
devices thus are used in order to avoid the old requirement of
impact, in many jurisdictions.56
In cases where the problem of liability for physical conse-
quences of emotional disturbance has come before the courts in
connection with the Workmen's Compensation Act, the courts
have been liberal in allowing compensation. This is not surpris-
ing when one realizes that the compensation system is main-
tained, not to penalize the industry for its misconduct, but to
take care of the victims of work-accidents.57
Conclusion
The author's aim has been to focus attention on develop-
ments in the field of recovery for psychosomatic injuries, and
at the same time to try to trace the evolution of the present con-
cept that liability in some instances may arise without any dis-
cernible physical injury. The experience and study of the medi-
cal profession are becoming increasingly influential in these legal
decisions, which now reflect what has long been apparent to the
physician-that the individual's emotional and physical security
are not, and cannot, be completely compartmentized or isolated
from each other.
Actions involving physical injuries more and more frequently
will include counts relating also to injuries to the mind, and the
forward steps in medicine will be mirrored in legal interpreta-
tions.
52 Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N. E. 716 (1929); but see,
Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N. E. 2d 694 (1936).
53 Housh v. Peth, 133 N. E. 2d 340 (Ohio, 1956).
54 Duty v. General Finance Co., 273 S. W. 2d 64 (Tex., 1954).
55 Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing, 137 F. Supp. 764 (D. C., So. Car.,
1956).
56 See, King, Some Recent Developments in the Law of Torts, 137 N. Y.
L. J. (36) 4 (Feb. 21, 1957); and for current developments see NCS (curr.
issues, Oleck, ed.).
57 Matter of Thompson v. Binghampton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N. Y. S. 355
(1927); Matter of Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745, 211 N. Y. S.
932, 242 N. Y. 577, 152 N. E. 434 (1926).
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